	3 March 1957
	Copy No. 13
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE	DOCUMENT NO
BULLETIN	CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE CONTROL REVIEWER:

25X1A			100	
Approved For Releas	se 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T009	75A90	3000100	001-6

	CONTENTS	25X1A	
o K	2. REVOLT IN EAST INDONESIA		25X1A
ρK	3. THE SITUATION IN THAILAND		
οħ	4. SOVIET-HUNGARIAN DISCUSSIONS ON SOVIET TROOF REPORTEDLY TO BEGIN IN MARCH	PS	25X1A
٥ħ	5. BRITAIN WARNS OF INABILITY TO HOLD LINE ON CH TRADE CONTROLS	HINA	
	25X1A		

3 Mar 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2

25X1A Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003000100001-6 **Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

25X1A


2. REVOLT IN EAST INDONESIA

25X1A

The revolt of East Indonesian commander Lt. Col. Samual on 2 March against Djakarta's authority follows essentially the same pattern as that of dissatisfied army leaders in Sumatra last December. Like the Sumatrans, the East Indonesians are demanding greater autonomy and better economic treatment.

East Indonesia, the territorial command centered on Celebes and including the Moluccas, Lesser Sundas and Bali, had earlier given numerous indications of rising discontent. Samual himself had given the impression that he sympathized with these dissident attitudes.

The East Indonesian break over the issue of autonomy comes at a time when Moslem and non-Javanese opposition to President Sukarno's plan to include Communists



3 Mar 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

25X1APage 5

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : GIA-RDP79T00975A003000100001-6

in the government is on the upswing. It also coincides with a recent report that Moslem leaders in East Indonesia, as well as Sumatra, have been alerted to "take action" in early March if Sukarno persists in his plans.

The process of fragmentation in Indonesia may not end with Samual's action. The restiveness of neighboring Borneo suggests that leaders on that island may be considering similar action. If this should occur, the Djakarta government will have lost control over virtually all of Indonesia except the island of Java.

Meanwhile, former vice president Hatta has publicly warned that Sukarno's plan is bound to fail. This statement will probably have the effect of stiffening resistance to Sukarno's concept, particularly by the Moslem parties.

25X1A

3 Mar 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 6

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003000100001-6 25X1A

25X1A	3. THE SITUATION IN THAILAND
ZONIA	The state of emergency declared throughout Thailand on 2 March was designed to cope with apparently spontaneous demonstrations of popular disgust over irregularities in Bangkok during the 26 February national elections. There is no evidence that, as implied by the government, these demonstrations have been inspired by the Communists. Late reports indicate that tension in the capital city has somewhat abated, although the situation remains potentially explosive.
	The American embassy in Bangkok has been informed that the government has appointed a commission of nonpolitical career officers to investigate electoral irregularities. In addition, Premier Phibun has reminded

the public of its legal recourse under the electoral law in any cases of fraud.

The Thai army chief, General Sarit, who during the emergency is in command of all armed forces including the police, may be tempted to take advantage of his enhanced powers to undermine his rival, Police Director General Phao. As the official who would be held responsible for electoral frauds, Phao is in a highly vulnerable position. While the government radio denies reports that the police chief has been taken into custody, he apparently has not been participating in the emergency meetings of high officials.

In commenting on the present crisis, Khuang Aphaiwong, the leader of the opposition Democrat Party, reportedly stated that everything depended on Sarit, with many people expecting the latter to emerge as the people's hero by stepping in to demand new Bangkok elections while at the same time getting rid of Phao.

25X1

3 Mar 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A903000100001-6

4. SOVIET-HUNGARIAN DISCUSSIONS ON SOVIET TROOPS REPORTEDLY TO BEGIN IN MARCH

REPORTEDLY TO BEGIN IN MARCH
25X1A

Recent statements by Hungarian Foreign
Ministry officials support a report passed
to American officials by the Austrian minister in Budapest that Soviet-Hungarian
discussions on a "status-of-troops" agreement are to begin in March. A Hungarian
Foreign Ministry official told an AP correspondent that such discussions would begin

in the "second half of March," and the Hungarian protocol chief informed the British air attaché that talks on the subject of Soviet troops in Hungary "are beginning."

The Austrian minister believes the regime may hope to head off expected unrest on 15 March, the anniversary of Hungarian independence, through a "broad hint" that if all goes well some favorable result will be forthcoming. The American legation in Budapest adds that it is not impossible that the USSR has made the successful handling of the situation in March by the Kadar regime a prerequisite for negotiations on the reduction or redisposition of Soviet forces in Hungary.

Comment The reduction or redisposition of Soviet troops, while it would not reconcile the population to the current regime, would reduce some of the

population to the current regime, would reduce some of the tension by making less obtrusive the principal symbol of subjugation and defeat.

3 Mar 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 8

5. BRITAIN WARNS OF INABILITY TO HOLD LINE ON CHINA TRADE CONTROLS

25X1A

The British government doubts that it will be able to "hold the line" much longer in maintaining controls on trade with China over and above those with

the rest of the Soviet bloc, the Foreign Office informed the American embassy in London on 1 March. The government contends that in view of Britain's precarious balance of payments situation, the additional China controls are an unnecessary burden on the economies of both Britain and its dependent overseas territories. It also cites the severe pressure at this time from political and business circles for a relaxation of controls.

With regard to East-West trade in general, the government considers that controls should be confined to items of real strategic importance and not used as a weapon of economic warfare. It believes present controls are more extensive than strategic considerations require and sees no justification in recent events for adding to them.

Comment

This appears to represent a significant shift in the government's position. On 4 February the American embassy reported that while the

government agreed with its critics on China controls, it would not accede to their demands for relaxation for reasons of international policy.

Page 9